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Lord Bramwell and the Political
Economy of Liberal Jurisprudence
Individualism, Freedom, and Utility
by

DAVID ABRAHAM*

George William Wilshere Bramwell (1808-92)1 is not a name immediately recognized by the casual student of torts, labor law, or legal theory. Nor does this judge and Law Lord appear to be one of those mighty
nineteenth century English figures familiar to general students of modem
British history. 2 Although he played a pivotal role in at least two key
developments in English law-the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852
and the Companies Act of 1862 3-he was overshadowed by numerous
contemporaries. After recounting the steps in his schooling and career, the
Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law says the following of
Bramwell:
An exponent of rugged individualism and a master of blunt clarity in expression,
Bramwell as commissioner played an important part in the introduction of limited
liability and in the 1852 reform of procedure. As judge he was domineering,
entertaining and consciously concerned to mould the law to ends which he
4
favoured. A biography is long overdue.

Early on a free-trading political economy Liberal in the spirit of the radi*David Abraham is an Associate Professor at the University of Miami School of Law.
For their assistance in providing sympathetic but hardnosed readings of both Baron Bramwell and this paper, I would like to thank Steve Diamond, Peter Mandler, and Alan Watson.
For outstanding research and editorial assistance, thanks to Paul Feltman and Cary Hall.
1. After 1882, Baron Bramwell of Hever.
2. I base this remark on the absolute paucity of biographical literature on Bramwell or of
monographs that discuss him at any length whatsoever. P.S. Atiyah does have a few interesting pages on Bramwell in THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1979) (hereinafter cited as "ATIYAH"), at 374-380.
3. See, 22 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 256-57 (Supp. 1921). Limited
liability was extended to all registered companies in 1856, while the company code, the
framework for which had existed since 1844, was consolidated in the Act of 1862, where
Bramwell added the word "Limited."
4. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 74 (A.W.B. Simpson
ed., 1984). The son of George Bramwell, a banker, the future judge attended the Palace
School at Enfield and became a clerk in his father's bank. Thereafter, his entry recounts that
he was admitted to Lincoln's Inn in 1830, to the Inner Temple in 1836 and to the bar in
1838, after serving as a special pleader from 1834-38. He became a bencher in the Inner
Temple and a Queen's Council in 1851, and then climbed the judicial and social ranks: a
Baron of the Exchequer from 1856-76, knighted in 1856, a member of the Law Journal from
1876-81, a Privy Counsellor in 1876; he attained the title of Baron Bramwell of Hever in
1882, and was admitted to the Royal Society the same year. Id.
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cal and pro-Revolutionary Cobden and Bright, Bramwell, in the last quarter of the century, came to despise Gladstone, the extension of the suffrage, the new softness of "grandmotherly legislation," and the decline of
common law virtue. Bramwell was one of a generation who came of age a
radical of sorts, a man who would have been impossible without the
French Revolution, but a man who ended his days as an outraged Liberal
Unionist and defender of landed property and landlords. 5
All told, Bramwell was hardly unique among elite Englishmen. All
told, he may have been just short of a great jurist. But there is no doubt
that his opinions, like his life trajectory, tell us a great deal about liberal
values, "bourgeois" conceptions of causality and agency, negligence and
responsibility, contract, liberty, and individualism. His views consistently
represent the expansiveness and confidence of the mid-19th century
Crystal Palace world: 6 disdainful of the lethargy and hideboundness of
Tory England and its "strict liability" world, naive and ultimately presumptuous as to the wants and needs of a rapidly growing class of industrial laborers, certain that liberal reforms had ushered in the age of equal
justice.
Although a firm believer in Adam Smith's economics, Bramwell
found little room for Smith's theory of moral sentiments; capable of alluding to the theories of Karl Marx, there is no reason to believe Bramwell engaged Englels's expos6 of the conditions of working class life in industrial
Manchester; 7 embarrassed by and scornful of the cruelties of eighteenth
century criminal law, he, nevertheless, became certain by the end of his
career that any legitimate need for reform in Britain had come to an end.
I. From Old Strict Liability to New Negligence
Bramwell makes an early, fleeting appearance for many law students
5. This description, like much of the information appearing in this essay, is drawn from
the only extended account of Bramwell available in the United States, CHARLES FAIRFIELD, SOME ACCOUNT OF GEORGE WILLIAM WILSHERE BARON BRAMWELL
OF HEVER AND HIS OPINIONS (1898) (hereinafter cited as "FAIRFIELD"), at 70.
Fairfield's is one of those sycophantic and tedious works characteristic of the memoir genre
of the period, capable of describing a judge's role as "dispens[ing] the King's justice, which
British subjects have learnt to believe can be nothing but perfect" without a trace of irony.
FAIRFIELD at 70.
6. On the Crystal Palace as exhibition and as symbol, see e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOBHOUSE, 1851 AND THE CRYSTAL PALACE (1950); JOHN TALLIS, TALLIS'S HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE CRYSTAL PALACE (1852); NIKOLAUS PEVSNER, HIGH VICTORIAN DESIGN (1951); THOMAS RICHARDS, THE COMMODITY
CULTURE OF VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1990) (hereinafter cited as "RICHARDS"). On
The Economist and the Age of Equipoise, see, WILLIAM BURN, THE AGE OF
EQUIPOISE (1964), W.E. MOSSE, LIBERAL EUROPE: THE AGE OF BOURGEOIS
REALISM 1848-1875 (1974).
7. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND (1844); CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES
(1990).
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in a leading Torts casebook's introductory discussion of negligent harm,
duty of care, and foreseeability.8 Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co.9
was a successful appeal of a jury award to a householder whose home was
damaged by water escaping through a frozen and ice-encrusted plug in the
pipes near his home. The jury had found "negligence of the defendants in
not keeping their water-pipes and the apparatus connected therewith in
proper order." The defendant water company had been incorporated by
statute in the late 1820s for the purpose of supplying the city with water,
and, indeed, in its day, the Birmingham water supply was a marvel and
model-one of those features of life that led Britons to speak of "the full
morning of our national prosperity" and an endless "Age of Improvement." 10
Apparently, the jury in the County Court of Birmingham had been
somewhat less impressed. The company had, of course, been charged by
the Act with maintenance of the water system, including its plugs. In the
event, the jury found that the company had failed to use "proper care to
prevent the accident." The judges of the Exchequer, on the other hand,
unanimously exonerated the company. Their conception of negligence
and the duty of care was not based on an obligation to "keep it where it
belongs" but rather on a more limited and active notion of responsibility,
one bounded by prudence, reasonability, and an assessment of "average
circumstances." 11 "Average circumstances" were particularly important,
because atypical conditions, like the unusually cold winter of 1855, "constitute[] a contingency against which no reasonable man can provide."12
A second judge of the Exchequer believed that there had been no jury
question to begin with; absent clear negligence, finding against the Water
Works would "make the company responsible as insurers" 13 rather than as
businessmen.
Bramwell went the furthest of the three judges. Not only did he
restrict the conceptions of liability and negligence, he sought to remind us
all of the respect owed those who undertake socially utilitarian entrepre8. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT AND ACCIDENT
LAW 8 (1983). Blythe is also cited, among others, in WILLIAM PROSSER, ET AL.,
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1988) 138 and RICHARD POSNER, TORT LAW:
CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982) 208.
9. 11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856).
10. See, DONALD READ, ENGLAND, 1868-1914 6 (1979); ASA BRIGGS, THE AGE
OF IMPROVEMENT 1783-1867 (1960, 1965) (hereinafter cited as "BRIGGS"); HAROLD
PERKIN, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN ENGLISH SOCIETY 1780-1880 (1969) (hereinafter cited as "PERKIN").
11. "Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do." (opinion of Alderson,
B., at 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049).
12. Id.
13. Opinion of Martin, B.; id. Martin's fear represents a rather prescient observation as to
how one gets from the "old" strict liability to the "new." Insuring one's business undertakings has become central to the "new" strict liability.
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neurial activity:
The defendants were not bound to keep the plugs clear. It appears to me that the
plaintiff was under quite as much obligation to remove the ice and snow which
had accumulated, as the defendants. However that may be, it appears to me that it
would be monstrous to hold the defendants responsible because they did not foresee and prevent an accident, the cause of which was so obscure .... 14

In an age where commercial initiative was central to the greatness of
England, individuals had as much of a duty to look after themselves as
business enterprises had to ensure their safety. Any excessive burdening
of entrepreneurs with liability not manifestly theirs was both a drag on
that initiative and an invitation to negligence on the part of others. 15
Of course, commitment to fault only for the natural and probable
consequences of one's activity is a principled position, and one sufficiently general that, under particular circumstances, it might benefit any member of society. Thus, in a suit between two neighboring small farmers,
Bramwell held that "if a man has the misfortune to lose his spring by his
neighbor digging a well, he must dig his own well deeper."1 6 Initiative,
and adequate deference toward it, belonged to the spirit of the age. Not all
initiative is equally meritorious, but even when one does bad things, and
even if the doer is a wretch, he should be held responsible only for the
act's probable consequences.
Hence, Bramwell's opinion in Regina v. Horsey.17 Horsey was
indicted for the murder of a man who died in a fire he had set. Horsey had
ignited a stack of straw in an enclosure; the victim was seen in the flames,
and his body was later recovered from the enclosure.1 8 Many a "but for"
determination could be invoked to sustain a charge of felony murder
along with arson. Bramwell's charge to the jury, however, reflected the
same deference toward limiting liability he had extended to the
Birmingham Water Works. One is not answerable:
except for the natural and probable result of his own act; and, therefore, if you
should not be satisfied that the deceased was in the enclosure at the time when
the prisoner set fire to the stack but came in afterwards, then as his own act
intervened between the death and the act of the prisoner his death could not be

14, Opinion of Bramwell, B., at id.
15, See e.g., Waite v. North Eastern Railway Co., E.B. & E. 728, 120 Eng. Rep. 682
(1859) where Bramwell concluded that a railroad was not liable for injuries to a child in its
grandmother's arms at the time she was struck by a train while trying to corss the tracks. The
railroad was not at fault vis-a-vis the grandmother, and to hold it responsible vis-a-vis the
infant would discourage entrepreneurial initiative while encouraging reckless pedestrian and
parental behavior.
16. Ibbotson v. Paet, 3 H.&C. 650, 159 Eng. Rep. 684 (1865).
17. 3 F. & F. 287, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (1862). It might also be noted that Bramwell
strongly advocated that "a prisoner should be allowed to tender himself as a witness," and
subject to the discretion of the Court, cross-examined. See FAIRFIELD at 100.
18. The case is considered as an example of "non-voluntary but abnormal human conduct" by H.L.A. HART AND TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 349 (2d ed.
1985). Their description may be apt enough, but for Bramwell the abnormality of the conduct is of little relevance.
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the natural result of the prisoner's act. 19

Horsey was duly acquitted.
There is no denying that the erosion of European medieval conceptions of full or strict liability only weakly hinged to fault was closely connected to the rise of capitalist entrepreneurship and bourgeois conceptions
of individual human agency. 20 Premodern strict liability may have helped
to secure the political and social status quo and it certainly functioned as a
drag on commerce. The classic case often adduced, The Case of the
Thorns (1466), surely respected order over initiative: "for though a man
doth a lawful thing, yet if any damage do thereby befall another, he shall
answer for it, if he could have avoided it.. . And the reason of all these
cases is, because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed." 2 1 Such
19. Horsey, supra note 17, 176 Eng. Rep. at 129. Accord, the rather more famous case of
Regina v. Faulkner 13 Cox C.C. 550 (1877) (sailor's bungled felonious effort to tap a keg of
rum did not make the resulting fire and destruction of the ship a probable consequence of his
actions).
20. On this point, Marx, Weber, Polanyi, Dobb, and a host of others would agree. For a
more strictly speaking legal consideration of the problem, see Morris Arnold, On Trespass,
103 SELDEN SOCIETY VOL. 1(1987); WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW VOL. 111299-311 (1929) and HOLDS WORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS
LEGAL HISTORIAN (1928). On America, see MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
The Companies Act of 1867 marked, in some respects, a culmination of the transformation.
A full examination of the political or class valence of various theories of liability lies
beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, one can helpfully view Bramwell's jurisprudence as a reflection of Victorian England's absolute faith in progress and of its ideas for
realizing it. As Eric Hobsbawm has written, Victorians invented the concept of a "Standard
of Living," and equated it not with leisure time or social equity, but with increased access to
the material fruits of a widening industrial and economic empire. HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1750, 61-64
(1968); (hereinafter cited as "HOBSBAWM") for a study of Victorian consumerism, see
also, RICHARDS, supra note 6.
For many middle class Victorians, the standard of living was rising so quickly that it was
perfectly reasonable to expect that its continuation would transport the human race "to a
state of happiness and virtue, which a fond imagination loves to ascribe to [the] primitive
condition of man." HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE, THE MISCELLANEOUS AND
POSTHUMOUS WORKS OF HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE, 309 (Grant Allen ed., vol. 1,
1885), quoted in BRIGGS, supra note 10, at 3. This faith in progress came to be held with
supreme conviction, reflected in CHARLES DARWIN'S conclusion in ORIGIN OF THE
SPECIES (1859) that because "natural selection works solely by and for the good of each
being, all corporal and mental environments will tend to progress toward perfection."
Quoted in BRIGGS, supra, at 401.
These fruits-whether they be in the new steam trains that crisscrossed all England or a
water company that sent water directly into individual homes--came about because capitalists invested money and imagination in enterprises which posed a far greater physical danger
than had been the case in the pre-Industrial economy and because manufacturers, capitalists,
consumers, and, presumably, laborers were free to contract among themselves and each other.
Thus, according to the Victorian ideology, individuals could break out of their social classes
and improve their lives. And, in this way, British society could evolve incrementally, the
British way, rather than through the abhorrent French form of progress-violent revolution.
21. Cited in KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 134. Even here, however, the countertendential "if he could have avoided it" is to be found.
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talk does not encourage the digging of wells.
A similar attitude controlled the Tithe Case (1506),22 an action of
trespass to goods. There, the tithe portion of a crop had been removed by
the defendant to the parson's barn in order to secure it against theft.
Unfortunately, it was stolen from there, and the good-doing defendant
was found thereby to have promoted the theft, since in trespass "the intent
is not to be construed." The principle that every man acts at his peril and
is liable for all the consequences of his acts left the burden of showing no
negligence on the defendant, at least in generic trespass cases. Thus, in
Weaver v. Ward (1616),23 an accidental shooting injury during a war
game brought strict liability down upon the defendant:
in trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss [animo
felonico is irrelevant]; and, therefore, no man shall be excused of a tres-

pass... except it may be judged utterly without his fault; as if by force a man take
my hand and strike you....

The same rule still governed toward the end of the seventeenth century. In
Bessey v. Olliot (1682),24 it was declared that "in all civil acts the law
doth not so much regard the intent of the actor as the loss and damage of
the party suffering." In the same year, in Dickenson v. Watson, a tax collector armed with guns "for the better discharge of his office" shot the
plaintiff and pleaded accident. He was nevertheless found liable "for in
trespass the defendant shall not be excused without unavoidable necessity." As late as 1724, Underwood v. Hewson was explained on the simple
premise that "trespass lies for an accidental hurt."25
As long as the focus remained almost exclusively on the defendant,
it often proved difficult to expand the intent/no intent framework sufficiently as to capture the intervening quality of negligence. One means of
mitigating so constricting an understanding of liability lay in augmenting
the responsibility of one's fellows. The road to blaming the Birmingham
Water Works customer for failing to remove ice and snow from the plug
near his home 26 was not a short one. As late as 1809, the salience and
force of "contributory negligence" still required elementary explanation.
In Butterfield v. Forrester,27 the plaintiff's failure to ride his horse "with
reasonable and ordinary care" disqualified him from recovering damages
after his horse crashed into an obstruction set up by the defendant in the
course of improving his property. It was now no longer enough that the
plaintiff was not drunk or that the defendant had failed to erect cautions:
22. Y.B. 21 Hen 7, f.27, pl. 5, reprinted in CECIL S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND
SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 197 (1949) (hereinafter

cited as "FIFOOT").
23. King's Bench, 1616; Hobart 134; reprinted in KEETON ET. AL., supra note 8, at
134-35.
24. Quoted in FIFOOT, supra note 22, at 190, as is infra Dickenson v. Watson. infra.
25. Id. at 191.
26. See supra p. 291 ("the plaintiff was under quite as much obligation to remove the ice
and snow which had accumulated, as the defendants"--Brarnwell).
27. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (King's Bench 1809)
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"One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary
care for himself."28
The later focus on negligence avoided the old trespass and strict liability outcomes. Bramwell indirectly indicated how this worked in the
case of Holmes v. Mather (1875).29 The defendant's horses, driven by his
groom in his presence, ran away and knocked down the plaintiff.
Bramwell and the jury agreed that neither master nor servant were at all to
blame. The plaintiff had argued that "[t]respass would lie even where the
injury was a pure accident, provided only that it were immediate"-thereby insisting on strict liability once causality had been established. The
defendant had argued that "as there was fault in nobody, the action could
not be maintained in any form"-thereby insisting on an intent test. In his
judgment for the defendant, Bramwell came around to the centrality of
negligence:
If the act that does an injury is an act of direct force vi et armis, trespass is the
proper remedy (if there is any remedy) where the act is wrongful, either as being
wilful or being the result of negligence. Where the act is not wrongful for either
of these reasons, no action is maintainable ....30

Thirteen years later, in the Privy Council of the House of Lords,
Bramwell could extend the attack on strict liability by assailing vicarious
liability or agency liability--"quifacitper alium"--in negligence. 3 1
Not surprisingly, the feudal elite was rot alone in resisting the more
fluid, mobile, and insecure environment of liability predicated on demonstrable fault. Juries too were capable of imposing older community values
that would restrict the bourgeois remaking of the world. One of America's
greatest and most forward-looking judges was faced with this problem in
the mundane case of Brown v. Kendall.32 In this case, the plaintiff had
unintentionally been struck in the eye and injured by a "stick" (four feet
long!) being wheeled by the defendant, who was in the process of
attempting to break up a fight between two dogs, one belonging to each of
the parties. For its own reasons, the jury had ruled for the plaintiff. Chief
Justice Shaw, however, reframed the issue, moving intentionality closer to
the question of effect. Reconceptualized, "the case involves the question
how far and under what qualifications, the party by whose unconscious
act the damage was done is responsible for it."
Shaw, who was highly conversant with British developments,
acknowledged that "it is frequently stated by judges, that when one
receives injury from the direct acts of another, trespass will lie." Yet, he
rejected the implication that "damage received by a direct act of force
from another will be sufficient to maintain an act of trespass" independent
of intentionality or carelessness. Instead, Shaw averred that a "plaintiff
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 927 (Lord Ellenborough, C.J.)
L.R. 10 Exch. 261, quoted in FIFOOT, supra note 22, at 188.
Id.
The Bernina, 13 App. Cas. 1, 12 (1888).
60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1850).
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must come prepared with evidence to show either that the intention was
unlawful or that the defendant was in fault .. "33 Respect for the goals of
human activity required that "in the prosecution of a lawful act, a casualty
purely accidental arises, no action can be supported for an injury arising
therefrom." Shaw thereby rejected the more rigorous requirement-"prudence of the most prudent kind of men" 34-and its negative implication
for industriousness-"where a person is doing a voluntary act, which he is
under no obligation to do, he is held answerable for any injury which may
happen to another, either by carelessness or accident." 35 Rejecting the
residues of old strict liability, Shaw ordered a new trial:
[since] the defendant was doing a lawful act, and unintentionally hit and hurt the
plaintiff, then unless it also appears to the satisfaction of the jury, that the defendant is chargeable with some fault, negligence, carelessness, or want of prudence,
the plaintiff fails to sustain the burden of proof and is riot
entitled to recover. 36

Shifts in precedent are not always smooth and even, and as a doctrine evolves, judges will almost inevitably give voice to countertendential elements within the doctrine. Thus, the last great statement of the old
strict liability emerged from the House of Lords in 1868 in the renowned
case of Rylands v. Fletcher.37 There, the defendants, Rylands and his
associate, built a reservoir for their mill which, though they had no reason
to know or suspect it, leaked water through old ("beyond living memory")
and abandoned mine shafts, consequently flooding and putting out of
commission the plaintiff's colliery. Sometimes, it was ultimately held,
"reasonable and prudent precautions" are not enough to escape liability.
When one "lawfully brings on his land something which, though harmless
whilst it remains there, will naturally do mischief if it escape," liability
will ensue. 38 "[T]ak[ing] all reasonable and prudent precautions to keep it
in" was found to be not enough; 39 there existed a duty to succeed.
Finding an "absolute duty to keep it in at his peril" was hardly a
determination conducive to commercial intercourse or self-improvement.
After all, commerce is said to be sweet (doux commerce),40 and not like a
33. Id.
34. Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62 (1835), reprinted in KEETON ET. AL at 135. Shaw, in
fact, cites Vincent at this juncture in his opinion, but he rejects the standard set in that case.
35. Id., 60 Mass. 292.
36. Brown v. Kendall at 224, KEETON ET. AL., supra note 8, at 139. On the role of
"innocent ignorance" in commerce, see The Nitro-Glycerine Case, 82 U.S. 524 (15 Wall),
21L.Ed. 206 (1872) (Field, J., citing and defining "negligence" according to the definition
given in Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, Co.).
37. Fletcher v. Rylands, [3 H & C 774, 159 Eng.Rep. 737 (1865), L.R. I Exch. 265
(Exch. Ch. 1866)], 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868). See WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 329-49 (2d ed. 1955) (hereinafter cited as "PROSSER").
38. Id., at 339.
39. Id.
40. The phrase is Montesquieu's. Similar sentiments are to be found in Hume and, broadly, in the Scottish moral philosophers. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS
AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS
TRIUMPH 56-93 (1977) (hereinafter cited as "HIRSCHMAN").
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dangerous animal whose escape simply must be prevented. The Lords,
nonetheless, reverted to the "at his peril" view of the agentic spirit; so
long as neither God nor the plaintiff himself was responsible for the damage, the defendant will be. Lord Cranworth even adverted to seventeenth
and fifteenth century cases to conclude that "the question in general is not
whether the defendant had acted with due care and caution, but whether
his acts have occasioned the damage." 4 1 The Lords were themselves testifying here: either to the autonomy of legal decision-making or to their
fidelity to the often indolent class of English landlords who massively
42
augmented their already great wealth by letting their lands to be mind.
It was not long before Rylands v. Fletcher came to be considered
wrong, or at least anomalous. In the northern United States, where landed
property arguably already enjoyed somewhat less special deference, the
reversion to old strict liability was flatly rejected. Noting that "our attention is called to a recent English case [Rylands] ...which seems to
uphold the claim made [by the plaintiff]," a New York court in Losee v.
Buchanan43 instead chose to praise what it called the "social state" as the
current and truest embodiment of "natural rights" in "civilized society":
the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed possession of my
real estate, and that I must so use my real estate as not to injure my neighbor, are
much modified by the exigencies of the social state. We must have factories,
machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold
wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any of
these upon my lands, and are not a nuisance, and are not so managed as to
become such, I am not responsible for any damage they accidentally and
unavoidably do my neighbor. He receives his compensation for such damage by
the general good, in which he shares, and he right which he has to place the same
things on his lands. (emphasis added)

In the same year, a New Hampshire court was just as explicit in
rejecting Rylands' principles of liability without negligence-on the
grounds of its social non-utility. 44 According to the Yankee judge, Lord
Cairns was "going back a long way for a standard of legal rights, and
adopting an arbitrary test of responsibility... [that] tends to embarrass and
obstruct much of the work which it seems to be man's duty carefully to
do." Bluntly put, Rylands imposed "a penalty upon efforts.. .to rise above
a condition of barbarism. It is impossible that legal principle can throw so
41. Id. at 148 citing Lambert v. Bessey L.R. 3 H.L. at 337: "if a man doeth a lawful act,
yet if injury to another ariseth from it, the man who does the act shall be answerable"; and
The Case of the Thorns, surpa. Cranworth added, for good measure, "sic uti suo ut non
loedar alienum."
42. See DAVID CANNADINE, LORDS AND LANDLORDS: THE ARISTOCRACY
AND THE TOWNS, 1774-1967 (1980); Anthony Rubinstein, Men of Property: Some
Aspects of Occupation, Inheritance, and Power, in ELITES AND POWER IN BRITISH
SOCIETY 144-69 (Philip Stanworth & Anthony Giddens, eds., 1974).
43. 51 N.Y. 476 (Commission of Appeals of New York 1873).
44. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 16 Amer. Rep. 372 (1873), excerpted in KEETON,
ET. AL., surpa note 8, at 153-54. Rylands and similar cases merely "substitute one suffering
party for another" without legal, moral, or practical reason.
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serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement."45 One
could, of course, understand where archaic rules originated and why they
retained a certain tenacity. But ultimately, they would have to give way:
It would not be singular if these [strict liability] rules should be spontaneously
produced at a certain period in the life of any community. Where they first
appears is of little consequence.... They were certainly introduced in England at
an immature state of English jurisprudence, and an undeveloped stage of agriculture, manufacturers, and commerce, when the nation had not settled down to
those modem, progressive, industrial pursuits which the spirit of the common
law, adapted to all conditions of society, encourages and defends. 46

While it would be insupportable simply to assume Bramwell's assent
to the words of others, his own opinions as well as his disdain for "grandmotherly legislation," extra-contractual considerations, and collectivist
measures of nearly any sort,47 all locate him solidly within the current
described here. As Bramwell explained in Bramford v. Turley,48 public
utility could not be served in a regime of strict liability, and any assessment of externalities reveals that public utility itself is but the fruit of private utilities.
The old strict liability tended to treat personal initiative as heavily
constrained by social norms and status quo preferences, innovation as perilous or "abnormally dangerous" activity, 49 and business enterprise as suffused with elements of public utility. Crudely put, such treatment favored
existing landed and state elites while putting obstacles in the way of commercial and industrial initiative. Many of these same vices/virtues can be
attributed to renascent strict liability impulses, except that nowadays they
seek to undermine the status quo structure of property and authority in
which commercial and industrial interests are the status quo rather than
partial-challengers to it.50
Much of the contemporary argument for expanded strict liability
rests on principles of cost sharing, social efficiency, and the like.51 At the
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. See infra. at 309-14.
48. 3 B. & S. 67, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (1862). As Bramwell also put it in Vaughan v. The
Taff Railway, 3 H. & N. 743, 157 Eng. Rep. 667 (1858): "It is for the public benefit that
trains should run, but not unless they pay their expenses."
49. On the evolution and reinflection of this category, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, §519-20 (1977).
50. Assume here that, for at least the first half or two-thirds of the nineteenth century, the
relationship between feudal/agrarian/aristocratic and capitlist/industrial-commercial/bourgeois groups was, at least in some critical respects, antagonistic. Assume, likewise, some
substantial divergence of interests between economically and politically dominant and subordinate classes today.
51. Guido Calabresi's work stands out here, beginning with Some Thoughts on Risk
Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) and The Decision for
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L.REV. 713 (1965). See
the extended historical and analytical discussion provided in KEETON ET. AL., supra note
8, at 826-1022. The best single volume offering a social-legal interpretation of the
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same. time, however, some commentators have seen advocacy of and
resistance to strict liability as elements of class conflict. Mark Kelman, for
example, writes that
One can view th[e] attack on strict liability as a simple, class-biased, result-oiented defense of corporate managers, those persons most likely to "unintentionally" harm others through routine business operations. Certainly, the bulk of strict
liability crimes. . . are most likely to be committed by those who control the
means of production. Of course, the defense of strict liability crimes is likewise
grounded in a political agenda-in an attempt to "get" harm-causing managersrather than in abstract "legal" thought.52

Modem strict liability offenses, it has been argued, were "aimed at the
businessman operating in the impersonal national market." As a tool of
social policy, "[they] posed a distinct threat to businessmen," and have
been fiercely opposed by theorists fearing class justice. 53
In this context, Rylands-like doctrine has experienced something
of a renaissance, although the defendants have often tended to be
either municipalities or monopolistic utilities. 54 As Prosser stated,
"[a]fter a long period during which Rylands v. Fletcher was rejected
by the large majority of American courts which considered it, the
."55
pendulum has swung to acceptance of the case and its doctrine. ...
In Lubin v. Iowa City, a case involving damage to a merchant's store
from a broken water main, the court observed that "[m]ost jurisdictions
which rejected Rylands v. Fletcher did so during that period of time
when our country was still young and expanding." 56 The Iowa judges
explicitly adopted Rylands but, nevertheless, struggled to establish
some measure of systemic negligence. 57 Not all judges have felt equally
evolution of tort law from "stranger's" negligence of the 1870's to the neo-conceptualism of
the 1970's is G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY (1980).
52. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 595, 611 (1981) (criticizing, among others, H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 152 (1968)).
53. WALTER L. GORDON, CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW: THE CALIFORNIA
EXPERIENCE 1960-75 8 (1981) (singling out in particular the protestations of Herbert
Wechsler).
54. Thus, the defendants in all four of the prototypical cases reproduced by KEETON ET
AL., supra note 8, at 593-600 were either municipalities or public agencies: Lubin v. Iowa
City, 257 Iowa 383, 131 N.W.2d 765 (1965), Jennings Buick, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 56
Ohio St.2d 459, 384 N.E.2d 303 (1978), Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Port of
Seattle, 80 Wn.2d 59, 491 P.2d 1037 (1971), Bierman v. City of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 497,
302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1969). The principles involved surely are not limited to supplying water.
55. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 332.
56. Lubin, supra note 54, at 768.
57. Hence: "If the city accepts the advantages of lower maintenance cost and other benefits which result from its practice of burying long lasting cast iron pipe six feet underground
beyond and reasonable opportunity to inspect and intentionally leaves them there until
breaks occur, it should also expect to pay for the damages resulting from such practice as a
cost of doing business in this manner." Id.
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constrained. 58 Indeed, although they are not addressed in this essay, the
entire domain of product and enterprise liability as it exists today would
be incomprehensible without the rejuvenation of strict liability doctrines.59

I. Liberty and Property
That most forms of strict liability are still widely considered "monstrous" testifies to the enduring values asserted and articulated by Lord
Bramwell and his contemporaries. That, where the corporate form has
been established, even negligent liability must be limited liability 60 testi-

fies to the centrality of the contract-property-liberty nexus. Bramwell's
world, like that of nineteenth century political economy in general, was
one in which people made bargains. For the son of a City banker, this
should be no surprise. In the climate of the age that produced him, bargains were, by definition, fair - agreements reached among willing parties, each obtaining what he bargained for and wanted. Moreover, contracts were the legal instruments through which the Victorian economy
realized its much-vaunted progress. One of the functions of judges was to
enforce such bargains, not to find pretexts for relieving parties of the burdens they had assumed. 61
As a gross, but fair, generalization, it may be said that within the
conception of "ordered liberty," the British bourgeoisie tended to emphasize the element of liberty where the landed elite stressed order.
Nevertheless, in the name of order, some Tories, from Disraeli to the present, have advocated social reform and welfare practices. In the name of
liberty, some Liberals, including men like Bramwell, have clung to a laissez faire, sometimes Darwinian image of society. Obviously, formal
equality cuts many ways, whatever the undoubted virtues it advances, and

58. One minor but flamboyant opinion has held that "when the task is the allocation of
burdens between a plaintiff who is little more than a bystander in his own society and government itself, talk of negligence leaves the highroad to justice in darkness." Bierman, supra
note 54, at 696. Judge Younger explicitly cited three non-negligence approaches: cost
spreading, injury prevention (i.e., costs borne by the party in a position to remedy the problem), and basic "fairness."
59. See WHITE, supra note 42, at 168-73, 197-207. On the political "refeudalization" of
the capitalist economy in the twentieth century, see, e.g. J.RGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975); Jay Feinman and Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW (D.KAIRYS ED., 1991), at 375-384.
60. It is alleged that Bramwell considered his contribution to the elaboration of limited
liability an extension of the principle of liberty of contract and one of his own chief achievements. EDWARD W. D. MANSON, THE BUILDERS OF OUR LAW DURING THE
REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA 133, 137 (1895).
61. "'Hold to your bargain' was one of his first principles." Id, at 139. Correspondingly, "so-called imprisonment for debt is not really imprisonment for debt, but for
dishonesty ... " Stonor v. Fowle, quoted in id.
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liberty may be of little help to most of those people nominally in possession of it.62
The absence of formal equality may be even worse. "Free-born" but
propertyless Britons of the eighteenth century were subjected to what may
have been one of history's most capriciously ruthless systems of elite
legal control-one in which the social contract was firmly cemented and
daily reeforced by fear. 63 The palliation of English law that preceded
Bramwell came about in response to both the threat represented by the
French Revolution, and the new social relations required by industrial life
and its business elite. 64 A new natural order had come into being and
Bramwell was able to take it for granted. He may have been troubled by
the overly complex structure of the law and the esoteric aspects of litigation remaining from the ancien regime. Hence, too, Bramwell's long-term
engagement on behalf of the Common Law Procedure Act (1852) and the
62. See, e.g. SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1970); ALAN
RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1984); C.B. MACPHERSON, LIFE
AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977); Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with
Negative Liberty in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ISAIAH
BERLIN 175-193 (A. Ryan ed., 1979).
63. See, e.g. DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE (1977) (hereinafter
: ited as "HAY"); E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE
BLACK ACT (1975)(hereinafter cited as "E.P. THOMPSON"); F. L. M. THOMPSON,
ENGLISH LANDED SOCIETY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1963) (hereinafter
-ited as "F.L.M. THOMPSON"); SIR LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 (1948) (hereinafter cited as
'RADZINOWICZ"); Randall McGowen, Terror and the Prison, in 25 JOURNAL OF
BRITISH STUDIES 312 (July 1986) (hereinafter cited as "MCGOWEN").
Hay argues that the explosion in the number of capital offenses-from about 50 in 1688 to
ver 200 by 1820-was coupled with frequent, often random royal and judicial grants of
nercy to create a terrifying sense of arbitrary omnipotence. Indeed, this appears to have
)een the goal, as one Member of Parliament stated in debate in 1810:
[T]he prevention of crime should be the chief object of law; and terror alone could prevent the commission of that crime under consideration. Although the law as it stood,
was but seldom carried into execution, yet the terror was precisely the same; and such
were minds of those upon whom it operated....
17 Parl. Deb. (1st ser.) 236 (1810), quoted in MCGOWEN, 312.
Radzinowicz does not defend the brutality of a criminal law which prescribed death for
leer-poachers and forgers, as well as murderers. He ascribes the huge increase in capital
:rimes, however, to the ruling class' reluctance to implement a police force large enough to
naintain a visible deterring presence; terror was thus seen as cost-effective, rather than
)rwellian. Moreover, he contends that the most brutal aspects of the criminal law were mititated by an excessively liberal criminal procedure, lax law enforcement, and a bench which,
iesitant to carry out death penalties for such a wide range of crimes, handed out such penalies only rarely. RADZINOWICZ, supra at 120-129.
64. See e.g. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 63, at 258-269; GEORGE RUDE, CRIMIqAL AND VICTIM: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY
,NGLAND (1985) 107-116; RUDI, HANOVERIAN LONDON, 1714-1808 (1971); HERdAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (lurking image of French revolutionary ship as
hreat to British legal structure); BRIGGS, supra note 10, at 236-285. Hobsbawm argues that
he much more significant political changes in the Reform Act of 1867 were only possible
'ecause, by this time, any real revolutionary threat posed by the working class had dissipatd. HOBSBAWM, supra note 20, at 102-103.
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Judicature Acts (1874, 1876).65 Substantively, however, his confidence in
his own enlightened times was impressive.
Addressing a group of would-be trade unionists he was about to sentence for impeding the access of fellow workers to their workplace, he
reminded them in 1859 that
for more than forty years the best men in this country... have been engaged in
removing restraints from trade, commerce, industry and labor. There is now no
monopoly in this land. There is no class legislation. There is no law that gives
one set of men an advantage for their own particular benefit. Now, you know that
as well as I do ....
you men are trying to... create a sort of corporate guilds
which were useful in times gone by, I dare say, but are quite otherwise in these
66
enlightened times.

Corporate guilds obviously belonged to feudalism and not to the
"enlightened" times ushered in by that legal child of the Enlightenment, le
67
loi Le Chapelier, which, in 1791, rendered guilds illegal in France.
Forgotten too were the repressive Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800,
which, of course, unlike le loi Le Chapelier,did not enjoy the benefit of
being part and parcel of a revolutionary process. Rather, they had been
part of an effort to keep the masses in check and to prevent revolutionary
contagion: the fear that "trade clubs would provide a cover for political
68
agitation" led to an assault on them as part of "an anti-Jacobin purge."
Formal legal equality, contracting equality, continued to concern liberals like Bramwell and led them to support anti-atavism legislation like
the repeal of the Corn [Tariff] Laws, the Catholic Relief Bill, eliminating
the more onerous disabilities Roman Catholics had faced, and various
65. FAIRFIELD, supra note 5, at 20. Dickens aside, the extent to which revised procedure or the fusion of law and equity represent increased legal equality cannot be considered
here.
66. Quoted in WILLIAM BURN, THE AGE OF EQUIPOISE: A STUDY OF A MIDVICTORIAN GENERATION 68-69 (1968); also DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL
BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727-1875 104 (1982).
67. On the liberal Loi Le Chapelier, see, e.g. WALTER KENDALL, THE LABOR
MOVEMENT IN EUROPE 13 (1975). The law prohibited "all professional or class corporations, all associations of employers, workers, or shopkeepers, all collective petitioning, all
strikes, all picketing, and all workers meetings" from appealing to "force, in the name of fraternity." Reprinted in THE MAKING OF LABOR LAW IN EUROPE 376 (B. HEPPLE ED.
1986); See J.M. THOMPSON, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 169-70 (1985).
When passed, the very extreme Loi le Chapelier was premised on a "guarantee of freedom
to all individuals at all costs and a limitation on the power of collective entitles to interfere
with this freedom." Silvana Sciarra, Regulating European Unions, 11 COMP. LAB. L. 141,
142 (1990). Seeing any collective enterprise as a threat to this freedom, it envisioned
ultimately abolishing all intermediate bodies in society and all economic activities carried
out by organized coalitions. Marx, of course, considered Le Chapelier one of the capstones
of the bourgeois revolution and said so both in CAPITAL and in his historical studies.
68. On the British "Combination Acts" of 1799, 39 Geo. 3, Ch. 81, see, e.g. ATIYAH,
supra note 2, at 529; ALAN FOX, HISTORY AND HERITAGE 73 (1985); BRIGGS, AGE
OF IMPROVEMENT, supra note 10 at 136 (trade clubs as cover) cites Pitt's fear that petitioning parliament and playing politics were the real goals of artisnal and laborer associations. The anti-Jacobinism assessment is that of ERIC EVANS, THE FORGING OF THE
MODERN STATE: EARLY INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN 43 (1983).
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Corporations Acts. Religious practice, like trade and the ability to contract
and make investments, needed to be free. 69 The manner in which Britons
might conduct their religious practice should now be left free, according
to Bramwell, as much as their right to trade and their ability to contract.
This conviction led Bramwell to oppose diverse forms of Sunday coercion, including, for example, the Sunday closure of museums, which he
70
spoke out against for years.
The "best men in this country" were less divided on the matter of
property. Whigs and Tories alike revered it and could conceive of no real
freedom or self determination without it. It was the common ground on
which the two nineteenth century fractions of the elite met, producing a
symbiosis in which, in the case of the English, the landed classes more
than held their own. 71 If Trilling's axiom is correct, and indeed "money is
terribly ashamed of itself,"72 it should not be surprising that like so many
erstwhile bourgeois radical liberals, Bramwell eventually suffered himself
to be "feudalized." 73
The free disposition of property easily became the touchstone of liberty itself. Indeed, the "liberty of a man's mind" could be measured by the
free exercise of his property rights. Bramwell made this connection in this
charge to the jury in the case of striking tailors accused of coercion:
The liberty of a man's mind and will to say how he shall bestow himself and his
means, his talents, and his industry, is as much a subject of the law's protection
as is that of his body .... The public has an interest in the way in which a man
disposes of his industry and his capital; and if two or more persons conspire... to
deter or influence him in the way in which he should employ his industry, his tal74
ents, or his capital, they are guilty of a criminal offence.

To be sure, "[t]he public has an interest" in the disposition of industry and
capital, but that public interest consists of ensuring to each individual absolute freedom in disposing of his industry and capital precisely as he pleases.
Liberty was thus axiomatically anchored in contract. And, soon
enough, contract becomes a question of resources. Thus, speaking six
years later to the striving employees of a savings bank, Bramwell made
the property-liberty connection clear and simple:
69. BRIGGS, supra note 10, at 194 points out that the liberal agenda of mid-century had
emphasized freedom: "Cash, Corn, and Catholics."
70. See, e.g. the Parliamentary debate (Lords) of March 20, 1885, 296 HANSARDS (3d
series) 3, at 15-18.
71. See, e.g. ARNO J. MAYER, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE OLD REGIME:
EUROPE TO THE GREAT WAR (1980) (hereinafter cited as "MAYER"), GEORGE
DANGERFIELD, THE STRANGE DEATH OF LIBERAL ENGLAND (1935) (hereinafter
cited as "DANGERFIELD").
72. LIONEL TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION 260 (1970).
73. For an explication of Max Weber's theories on the feudalization of various European
bourgeoisies, see H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER 363-395
(1957); see generally, RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1780-1950
(1958).
74. Regina v. Druitt, 10 Cox C.C. 592 (1867).
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Of all the good things which this would gives us, the best, in my judgment, are
liberty and independence. I believe that these good things.. .can be acquired in
one way only. The best friend you can have, one who never fails you.. is a wellfilled purse. Without that.. .a man is sure to be another's servant; he has not got
that which will enable him to exercise his own judgment as to what is best for
himself... But how is a man to acquire this valuable through unsentimental
friend? Only in one way-by industry, prudence, and thrift .... We know a man
7
never works so zealously as when he is at work for his own benefit. 5

Bramwell embodied the climate of an age when "free" most frequently referred to trade, competition, and contract. The "glory" of midcentury Liberalism had been "to root out from the economic and political
fields the last vestiges of paternal restraint and capricious interference
inculcated by medieval jurists and economists." 76 Like other faithful liberals grounded in political economy, Bramwell rested secure that "to the
working classes of 1780 the food and clothing within reach of the very
poorest Londoners in 1880 would represent luxury," while "callousnessor capacity to endure other people's suffering with equanimity-had
simultaneously diminished among the 'better classes.' 77 Dependency and
servility were signs of either primitiveness or decay, i.e., of the world
before liberal reform or the world sought by so-called socialists and advocates of "grandmotherly legislation." Nascent socialists and those in the
camp of the nostalgic alike had forgotten that "[in an age when the poor
friendless had few rights or protectors, 'contract' was an advantage not to
the strong, but to the weak." 78
This Whig conception of liberty as a function of property, and
expressed in contract, was both formal and negative. The assumption,
shared alike by Lockeans, Jeffersonians, and "Republicans," that liberty
required the possession of property is evident. This assumption linked
some nineteenth century Britons to their American counterparts. 79 Despite
the changes wrought, in principle, by the Civil War, New Deal, and equalprotection jurisprudence, we in the United States, like the Britons, have
75. Cited in FAIRFIELD, at 55.
76. FAIRFIELD at 84. The results included:
milder laws, increased prosperity, and the peaceful obliteration of class disabilities...
[Concurrently] already by 1870 a generation of Britons had reached manhood who had
never felt, nor even witnessed, infliction of conscious injustice, hardship or wrong by
their "rulers"; the old savage intransigeance [sic] of the early part of the century
among "the populace" was becoming a memory only. Id.
77. Id. at 87. It was this sort of view of the world that later led William Morris to conceive of the Liberals' heaven as a place where good-hearted liberal jurists doled out "champagne for the rich and margarine for the poor-in equal measure." WILLIAM MORRIS,
NEWS FROM NOWHERE 112 (1890); see E.P. THOMPSON, WILLIAM MORRIS:
FROM ROMANTIC TO REVOLUTIONARY (1977).
78. See FAIRFIELD, at 92.
79. It matters little whether, as in the American case, at least prior to the 1870s, the widespread distribution of property among whites encouraged a democratic or yeoman's liberty
or whether, as in the British case, property ownership and the possibility of active political
citizenship and participation were more limited.
The foundations and basic statement of this line of analysis were provided by BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 157-69
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yet to escape the linkage. 80 Although the point cannot be argued here, it is
safe to say that any contract-based conception of liberty must remain formal. 81 Ignoring background inequalities among the contracting parties is
to ignore what probably animates them and, in regard to the public sphere,
constitutes a regression from the Jeffersonian position.
Bramwell's Whig conception of liberty consisted entirely of what
Isaiah Berlin called "negative" liberty, the non-imposition of undue
restraint on competent individuals.82 Bramwell abhorred and feared
restraints, either feudal or socialistic; he rejected interference by outside
authority with individual behavior. Contract was, and even in contemporary scholarship and judicial opinion, many argue contract still is the para(1967); they have been developed further by JOYCE APPELBY, CAPITALISM AND A
NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790'S (1983). See also, J.
G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); WOOD,
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); John Murrin, The Great
Inversion, or Court vs. Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in England
(1688-1721) and America (1776-1816), in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688,
1776 (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1980).
On the relationship of this ideology to the propertyless and the enslaved, see, DAVID
BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 17701823 257-62 (1975); DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820, 55-77 (1971); Edmund Morgan, Slavery and
Freedom: The American Paradox,59 J.AM. HIST. 6 (1972).
On the liberty-property connection and the early American working class, see JOHN
ASHWORTH, AGRARIANS AND ARISTOCRATS: PARTY POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) (stressing rise of meritocracy and equality of opportunity as avenues for social progress); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW
YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850
(1984) (articulation of the same ideology by New York artisans and laborers, including antiBlack aspects); Herbert Morais, The Sons of Liberty in New York, in THE ERA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 269-89 (R. Morris ed., 1965).
80. One might well argue that it was only with the equal protection and due process
clauses of the 14th Amendment that citizenship rights began to be defined in a manner less
connected to property. Certainly, it was in defense of rights grounded in private property,
such as contracting rights, that the reading of the 14th Amendment was narrowed so as to
invalidate Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Laws. Similarly, raising the state action threshold
constituted a defense of the primacy of private property rights. See Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
The progress of the immediate Reconstruction years (1865-1877), facilitated by the vistas
opened up by the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, yielded to what W.E.B. DUBOIS called
the "counter-revolution of property" that lasted well into this century; see BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860-1880 580-636, 670-710 (1935) (northern capital joined
southern elite to liquidate progress of Reconstruction; regression back toward peonage and
slavery followed). As DuBois shows, nonelite whites were also set back by the liquidation of
Reconstruction. For a powerful recent discussion of the evolution of the liberty-property
relationship in the aftermath of the Civil War, see ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876; idem., Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L.REV. 863 (1986).
Remarkably, in all the available material on Bramwell, there is nary a mention of the U.S.
Civil War or the post-war amendments, despite the fact that, in other respects, he was very
au courant on American law, judges, and decisions.
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digm of such liberty, while power, especially public power or power originating in politics, is the prototypical menace to such liberty.
The Liberal spirit of negative liberty was a powerful force in the formation of the United States as well: eleven of the first twelve amendments
to the Constitution limited the powers of the national government; ten of
the first eleven amendments focussed on "shall nots." As Tory opponents
of the American radicals made clear, America's greatest libertarians were
slaveholders; 83 England's libertarians were political-economy free marketeers who were themselves able to justify, or at least countenance, the bitter fruits of the free market along with the sweet. 84
Whereas negative liberty is vulnerable to politically organized
power, positive liberty depends on or is a form of it. Quite apart from
"socialistic" conceptions of liberty, with which Bramwell in his later
years showed some, albeit selective, familiarity, 85 other conceptions of
positive liberty were available to his Whig generation. Toward the end of
th American Civil War, around the middle of Bramwell's active career,
Abraham Lincoln sought to define "liberty":
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American
people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using
the same word we do not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty
may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his
labor; while with others the same may mean for some men to do as they please
At the same time, corporations began to be central beneficiaries of the 14th Amendment.
See Santa Clara County v. Southern P.R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); First Nat' l Bank of Boston
v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The apogee of free-property jurisprudence may well have
been reached in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Rights as something grounded in
citizenship as such rather than in property finally emerged (at least for white Americans) in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). More recently, rights were further detached from property by the landmark decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) but then significantly reattached in Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), and Mathews v.
Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976).
See generally, Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.REV. 873 (1987); Owen
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L.REV. 1405 (1986); Mark Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L.REV. 1363 (1984) (each indicating, in different ways, how we
have yet to escape or transcend the dependence of liberty on (old style) property).
81. A point repeatedly made since debated by two other Bramwell contemporaries. See
KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 131-42 (Joseph
O'Malley ed. 1970)
82. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, supra note 62, at 121-31 ("Two
Concepts of Liberty," negative and positive, from and to).
83. "[Hlow is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes."
Samuel Johnson, Taxation No Tyranny, in THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON (1825),
vol. 6 at 262, quoted in A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR:
RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 377 (1978).
84. See e.g. Marx's discussion of political-economy free marketeers in CAPITAL, Vol. I,
Parts 5-7; Vol. II, Ch. 19-20; Vol. III, Part 3 (1881).
85. See infra at 317-18; also Bramwell's remarks at the Industrial Remuneraiton Conference held by the Liberty and Property League, Friday Afternoon, FAIRFIELD, at
249-253 and 419-427 (discussing whether the general redistribution of capital or land would
promote or impair the production of wealth and the welfare of the community).

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XXXVIII

with other men, and the product of other men's labor. 86

Lincoln's conception of liberty was distinctly non-utopian and nonsocialist, rejecting neither the market nor contract. Undoubtedly, Lincoln
appreciated "industry, prudence, and thrift." But, his was a positive form
of liberty, associating it with public power and the power to. Six of the
first seven post-Civil War amendments dramatically extended the powers
of the national government and included the phrase, "Congress shall have
the power. . . ." Clearly, nineteenth century elite images of liberty did not
have to remain static. And, even if Britain did not experience America's
or France's political upheavals, the static quality of Bramwell's "Plain
Whig Principles" remained startling. Perhaps, as with liberal England
generally, early and substantial success proved an impediment to subsequent evolution.
Stalled by its own power, coherence, and success, this rigidity was
not Bramwell's alone; it seems to have been characteristic of nearly the
entire English governing elite, including the judiciary, during the period
of high empire. 87 As the political-economy Whig world view lost its hold
on both the populace and the politicians, its staunchest adherents could
only conclude that the "seductive wealth, comfort, and prosperity created
by Free Trade must by degrees sap faith in the hard sayings of Free
Trade." 88
III. A Liberal Faith
The author of the Bramwell memoirs identifies him as a true political-economy Liberal, standing opposed to those "intellectual Whigs and
Radicals" who, for their own reasons, believed in the fixity of the class
structure. They
seem to have unconsciously taken for granted the permanent existence of three
classes: (1) Privileged, (2) enlightened, and (3) inferior. The former consisted of
landowners or aristocrats who represented privilege, traditional claims to govem,
most irrational... invalid, unreasonable nowadays, because opposed to the spirit
of the age.
The second, or enlightened, class consisted, in the eyes of philosophic
Liberals, of themselves and their friends. The third, or inferiors, comprised the
shopkeeping and working classes... the ignorant peasantry, objects for just rule,
philanthropic amelioration, prudent experiment, gradual enfranchisement. Out of
pure gratitude the third would surely always vote or shout for the second
class[.]89
86. Speech of April 18, 1864, 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN 301-02, cited in
JAMES MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 43-44 (1991). Lincoln continued, "We behold the processes by which thousands
are daily passing from under the yoke of bondage, hailed by some as the advance of liberty,
and bewailed by others as the destruction of all liberty." Id.
87. See DUMAN, supra note 66; DANGERFIELD, THE STRANGE DEATH OF LIBERAL ENGLAND, supra note 71.
88. FAIRFIELD, supra note 5, at 94.
89. FAIRFIELD, at 124. Gladstone seems to have been the politician most encumbered
by these illusions.
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Bramwell was certain such naive self-confidence would destroy
Liberalism, a position he shared with Chief Baron Pollock:
British aristocracy, after all, did represent in a shadowy way historic or legendary
claims to lead, based originally on what was in lawless times the most valid claim
of all-force. The highly-educated politician is found to represent a very shaky
title to pre-eminence when once "the populace," deprived of certain illusions by
universal education, cheap books and newspapers, begin to suspect, with all the
complacency of the half-taught, that there is nothing in intellectual superiority
after all.90

The autonomous individual was afflicted by neither the prejudice of
aristocracy nor the rudeness of scarcity. For him, the greatest liberty was
self-cultivation, or, in the more prosaic language of everyday life, con-

tracting.This required freedom from constraints:
I like to be governed as little as possible, and what I like for myself I like for others. No one can know my wants as well as myself, and I am pretty sure that no
one will take so much pains as I should to gratify them. I am certain that it is best
to leave what I may call natural causes to operate and bring about natural
results. 9 1

The problem with the socially-oriented New Liberalism of the 1880's was
that it abandoned the principle that people were autonomous and their
own best friends. In place of that principle, it articulated a new paternalism that pandered to those who would not do their own best. Legislation
that interfered with contract, "treats people as helpless, and, instead of
teaching them to struggle for themselves, adds to their feebleness by a
92

mischievous taking care of them."
Increasingly, for Bramwell, the Commons legislated in violation of
freedom of contract, mistakenly thinking, as he put it in Archer v. James,
that "the ignorance, improvidence, or poverty of the working classes, as
they are called -that is those who work for wages- is such as to require
the protection" of statute. 9 3 Nuisance and the burdening of others marked
a concession from or exception to this view that Bramwell openly accepted, even as he joined the Liberty and Property Defence League. Thus, he
supported legislation to address the white lead problem in north country
90. Pollock to Bramwell, 23 March 1858, excerpted in FAIRFIELD at 127.
91. Bramwell to Lord Elcho (Earl of Wemyss) upon joining the Liberty and Property
Defence League, Summer 1882, quoted in FAIRFIELD, at 133-34.
92. Laissez Faire, a Bramwell pamphlet published in 1884 by the Liberty and Property
Defence League, reproduced in id. at 139-147. Bramwell explicitly continued through the
1880's to identify with "Smith, Ricardo, McCulloch, J.B. Say, Bastiat" and their "successors" like Herbert Spencer and thinkers we now barely remember like Fawcett and Goschen.
On the "new liberalism," see e.g. PETER WEILER, THE NEW LIBERALISM: LIBERAL
SOCIAL THEORY IN GREAT BRITAIN 1889-1914 (1982); P.F. CLARKE, LANCASHIRE AND THE NEW LIBERALISM (1972).
93. Archer v. James, 2 B. & S.65, 88, 121 Eng. Rep. 998, 1006 (1859) (citing Smith's
WEALTH OF NATIONS and, at 1009, DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY). Bramwell also considered it unjustifiable interference with the freedom of
contract for Parliament to mandate that tenants receive compensation from their landlords
for improvements made to land and that a certain system be used for calculating the value of
improvements. Parl. Deb. (Lords) on the Agricultural Holdings Bill, Aug. 7, 1883, 282
HANSARDS (3d series) 1796, at 1824-25.
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factories-on the grounds that "people should not be allowed to conduct
themselves in a way to make themselves a nuisance to others, so the public had a right to say they should not ruin their health, and eventually
become a burden to the ratepayers." 94
Bramwell and the other political economy liberals within and outside
the legal profession remained wedded to the clear and seemingly unproblematic principles of liberalism's ascendant period. They were not oblivious to the fact that many autonomous individuals would lose the race and
suffer poverty and misery. As in the great free-trade and corn battles of
the first third of the century, protection was the foe of both the highborn
and the common man. 95 Whether a question involved tariffs or wages,
reduced competition meant higher costs and prices, which redounded only
to the benefit of a privileged and corrupted few. 96
The law, in any event, could not identify unwarranted suffering or do
anything about it. To attempt to intervene could only encourage mischief
and exacerbate anyway-ineradicable problems:
Leave everyone to seek his own happiness in his own way, provided he does not
injure others. Govern as little as possible. Meddle not, interfere not ....
Trust to
each man knowing his interest better, and pursuing it more earnestly than the law
can do it for him. I believe this maxim will justify most of the rules that right
economists have laid down-let your people buy in the cheapest and sell in the
dearest markets.
Poverty and misery shock us, but they are inevitable. They could be prevented
if you could be prevent weakness, and sickness, and laziness, and stupidity, and
improvidence, not otherwise. To tell the weak, the lazy, and the improvident that
they should not suffer for their faults and infirmities would but encourage them to
indulge in those faults and infirmities. It is said that poverty and misery may exist
withoutfault in the sufferer, it is true. But it is but rarely that they do, and the law
cannot discriminate such cases.97

Rare as unjustified suffering might be and beyond the reach of the
law as its correction should be, misguided paternalism was always a danger to its putative beneficiaries because it produced dependency and loss
of self-mastery. Thus, Bramwell in 1885 opposed medical relief for the
poor on the grounds that those so provided would not then be inclined to
take care of themselves:
the measure [is] contrary to the interests of those principally affected by it the poor themselves .... They ought to be impressed with the belief that there was
something not creditable in the receipt of parochial relief.... [There was a] danger of allowing our working people, who were already too prone to improvidence, to entertain the idea that they might make merry in good times and fall
...

back on the Poor Law in adversity.... 98

94. Parl.Deb. (Lords) July 19, 1883, 281 HANSARDS (3d series) 1865, at 1873-74
(debate on the Factories and Workshops Amendment Bill).
95. ERIC HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE 134-40, 225-48 (1968).
96. ParI.Deb. (Lords) of March 1, 1888, 322 HANSARDS (3d series) 1793, at 1801-2
(debating the Railway and Canal Traffic Bill).
97. Address to the British Association, 1888, reprinted in FAIRFIELD at 164-65, 178-89
(emphasis added).
98. Parl.Deb. (Lords) July 28, 1885, 300 HANSARDS (3d series) 218, at 232-3 (debate
on Medical Relief Disqualification Removal Bill).

1994

LORD BRAMWELL & POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIBERAL JURISPRUDENCE,

309

IV. Labor, Workers, and Inevitability
In both western Europe and the United States, the last third of the
19th century witnessed the primacy of the labor question -i.e., the emergence of class conflict, chiefly between capitalist industry and wage labor,
as the central contradiction of society. 99 In 1860, as Liberal politicians
were contemplating reform of the franchise, Bramwell, the Exchequer
jurist, authored an essay entitled "The Parliament of the Working
Classes." In it, he sought to predict the types of measures the working
classes would seek to procure for themselves. He seemed well aware that
the working classes now would not be interested in the franchise merely,
or even primarily, for the sake of enjoying the political fight to vote.1 00
Rather, the political question would invariably and quickly lead to the
social question. Bramwell began by recognizing that working people in
fact rejected his own view of contract as justice.
Now there is not one in a thousand of them but would say that they do not get the
wages they ought to get, and that they suffer from the tyranny of capital. It is vain
to say ... that there is no "ought" or "unjust" in the matter, and that there is no
proper connection between any quantity of pay other than that which is formed
where labour and capital are left to adjust their own terms. 10 1

Workers rejected his view because they were "blinded by a supposed
self-interest." Now, it is characteristic of ruling classes that they identify
their own interests as the general interest and the interests of other classes
as narrow self-interest. Often, the leading classes enjoy sufficient socialeconomic power and ideological prestige (and control) that they can in
fact make their own interests into the basis of a national interest, into
which the interests of other groups are then integrated.102 The resulting
equilibrium of class interests, though always shifting and unstable, can
form the basis of stable and relatively democratic government where contestation is relatively bounded. Indeed, such is the history of England and
the other "stable" democracies of the past century.103
What was perhaps singular about the hegemonic impulse of nineteenth century British liberalism was its insistence on the universality of
99. See e.g., ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL, 1848-1875 (1975);
GEORGE LICHTHEIM, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOCIALISM (1970); DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA (1979).
100. Two and three decades earlier, the Chartist movement had proven unable to establish or effectuate a connection between the franchise and equality. See G. D. H. COLE,
CHARTIST PORTRAITS (1941) (hereinafter cited as "G.D.H. COLE"); DOROTHY
THOMPSON, THE CHARTISTS (1984) (hereinafter cited as "THOMPSON"); and, especially, GARETH STEADMAN JONES, LANGUAGES OF CLASS (1983) (hereinafter
cited as "JONES").
101. Bramwell letter to Morning Herald, 19 Jan. 1860, quoted in FAIRFIELD, at 111.
102. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS,
161, 166-67, 181-82 (1971 ed.) (hereinafter cited as "GRAMSCI").
103. See, e.g. NICOS POULANTZAS, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES
(1975); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 7-46, 133222 (1985).
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contract and laws of political economy. Given his own firm anchoring in
these principles, it is not surprising that Bramwell was able in 1860 to
identify as worker goals precisely those sorts of measures that have, in
fact, become the staple of this century's organized labor and socialist
movements.
If this generation things 5s.6d. ought to be paid for nine hours, why should not
the next think it ought to be paid for eight? [After] indirect attempts to obtain a
larger share of the joint earnings of capital and labour by an increase of wages...
would [come the] claim to share the profits. The capitalist would still be permitted to carry on his trade. . . . [But] [t]hey would say that they as much as he
earned what was earned; that he got more than he ought, and they less than they
ought ....
Perhaps somewhat on the principles of the Income Tax Acts....
[they] would ascertain the average profits of the last three years, and wages
would have to be paid accordingly, with a provision that there should be a minimum rate. . . . Taxes on articles they consume would be repealed, and revenue
raised by direct taxation.. .and a duty put on property of all kinds.t04

To a contemporary reader, Bramwell's prescience is remarkable and a
reminder of the extent to which classical Marxist socialism was founded
on the same liberal, political-economy premises to which Bramwell so
fervently adhered.
As a jurist applying the law equally and fairly to all parties,
Bramwell knew that the basic assumptions of Britain's increasingly militant working class politics were "mischievous, perhaps dishonest," and
certainly "invidious and inaccurate." Even the term "working class" itself
was inaccurate because it meant to exclude all who do not receive wages
and invidious because it supposed that only the recipients of wages
worked. For Bramwell, railway companies were workers too, for they also
produced value. "But people treat railway companies ... as if, instead of
being public benefactors, they were a set of people who plundered the
public." 105 Perhaps class distinctions between productive and unproductive were possible in the pre-bourgeois or feudal world where the privileged did not work to create value, but such distinctions were untenable
now in a society that had overcome the hideboundedness of its Tory past
while also instituting legal and formal equality. 106
V. Contract as Fundament
"All that advocates of laissez faire demand is that freedom of contract shall not be interfered with without good reason."1 07 After all, the
great legal and social accomplishments of the century had been the bursting asunder of feudal constraints, the release of civilization's and indus104. The Parliament of the Working Classes, supra note 98, at 113-14.
105. Letter to the Economist, 24 August 1881, quoted in FAIRFIELD at 136.
106. For the later Bramwell of the 1880's, even the pre-bourgeois "feudal" elite had
served a useful purpose. By embodying the nation's "prejudices," it facilitated a political
equilibrium that was now more vulnerable in the era of equal contractual ties. "I have said
that the capitalist is an object of alarm and aversion. Next to him is the landlord." Id. at 137.
107. Laissez Faire, supra note 92, at 141-42.
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try's energies, and the widespread elimination of state despotism. Nothing
had been more important for Bramwell than "limiting the powers and
duties of the Government-in freeing the action of individuals from the
influence and control of the State."108 The principle of free contracting
could compel a judge, even a Law Lord like Bramwell, to invoke a selfdenying ordinance as well as providing a platform from which to assail
regulatory legislation.
The case of B- v. The Manchester, Sheffield & L. Railway Co. came
to the Law Lords in 1883 upon appeal. The manifest issue was a carrier's
liability for spoilage of a delayed shipment of fish where, in exchange for
a reduction in the rate charged, the fish dealer had waived carrier's liability.109 At issue was the meaning of the phrase "just and reasonable," as
applied to contracts under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854. The
Queen's Bench Division had ruled for the railway, but the Court of
Appeal reversed, holding the contract not just and reasonable ---on the
grounds that the plaintiff had been compelled to make the contract
in question, since if he paid the usual rate lie could not have competed
with rival fish dealers. In overturning the judgement of the Court of
Appeal, Bramwell presumably with some disingenuousness, observed the
following:
here is a contract made by a fishmonger and a carrier of fish who know their
business, and whether it is just and reasonable is to be settled by me, who am neither fishmonger nor carrier, nor with any knowledge of their business...
[Following the just and reasonable standard, people] have entered into contracts,
and having had the benefit of them, they have turned around and sought to avoid
them .... the fact that it (a contract) has been voluntarily entered into is the
strongest possible proof that it is a reasonable agreement .... I really do not
understand how [a contrary] conclusion could have been come to, except by
some generous feeling that railway companies ought to be kept for the benefit of
fish-mongers.

On the other hand, because of his distaste for intruding upon contacts after
formation, he insisted on the integrity of that formation. Thus, the need
for clear mutual assent was so paramount for Bramwell that he opposed
the "mailbox rule" of contract on the grounds that merely posting a letter
was itself an inadequate measure of confirmation and assent. l 10.
In the world of free agents and markets, there can be no such thing
as a contract of adhesion. Neither the wealth, nor the power of the parties
involved determines the value of the contemplated exchange.ll Of
course, we currently argue that to ignore or declare legally irrelevant any
108. Id. at 142.
109. The Lords' judgment is reprinted in FAIRFIELD, at 148-52.
110. Or, as he put it in dissent in British and American Telegraph Co. v. Colson, 6 L.R.Ex, 108, 118 (1871): "so if a man proposed marriage, and the woman was to consult her
friends and let him know, would it be enough if she wrote and posted a letter which never
reached him?"
11. See MARX, CRITIQUE, supra note 81, at 131-42; FRANZ NEUMANN, The
Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND
AUTHORITARIAN STATE 22-68 (H. Marcuse, ed. 1957); idem. The Concept of Political
Freedom, 53 COLUM.L.REV. 901,925 (1953).
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"background inequalities" among contracting parties is to ignore what
probably animates the parties and simply to define necessity as freedom.11 2 Legal neutrality which ignores economic, social, and political resources contributes palpably to reenforcing those preexisting inequalities.
For his part, in discussing whether workers should be allowed to
contract out of the Employers' Liability Act, Bramwell "confronted" the
argument that employers were "forcing" such contracts on their employees to elude the liability contemplated by the act. His comments document
the connection between political economy, contract principles, and individual liberty-as it existed and continues to exist in liberal ideology:
"Forcing." What is the meaning of that? How can a contract be forced on a man?
How can Mr.-, a lawyer, use such an expression? How can he, an economist,
use it? Does he not know that what advantages the workman is to have in wages
and otherwise is regulated, not by the will of the master, but by the "higgling of
the market" for labour? Does he not know that if the master gives more in one
way he must give less in others?! 13

Not only was the contemplated prohibition economically pointless and
legally unjustifiable, it was also morally corrupting. Any such measures
prevented legitimate bargains from being entered into and even tempted
men to "break the solemn engagements" they had contracted.114
The principle of liberty was "soldered on" to the principle of contract from the start. For Bramwell, who believed he was following
Pollock, English Common Law never attempted to "dictate in matters of
opinion." As a result, it was not for judges to second-guess parties in
regard to the "adequacy of consideration." He believed the English rejected a "metaphysical short-cut like the contrat social" and there was, therefore, no Common Law obligation "upon each to do anything for all." 115
When, in 1891, near the end of his career and life, Bramwell sensed that
principles of equity were again reappearing in and subverting that formalism of contract interpretation, he turned most dour:
...would [it] not have been better to have held people to their bargains, and
taught them by experience not to make unwise ones, rather than relieve them
when they had done so.. .? We should have been spared the double condition of
things, legal rights and equitable rights, and a system of documents that do not
mean what they say. 16

All this was another aspect of what Patrick Atiyah described as
Bramwell's "faith in the idea that if the facts were well known to the con112. See e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and other cases standing for expanded notions of "adhesion." See generally, Feinman and Gabel, supra note 59, at 373-86.
113. Laissez Faire,supra note 91, reproduced in FAIRFIELD, at 146.
114. The principle, of course, applied not only between employers and employees but
between any contracting parties. Thus, in Boulton v. James, 2 H. & N. 564, 566, 157 Eng.
Rep. 232, 233 (1857), Bramwell was content to let commercial parties contract out of basic
privity principles, because that is what they wanted in the four-corners of their contract. See
also Oldershaw v. King, 2 H. & N. 396, 157 Eng. Rep. 165, (1857).
115. Cited in FAIRFIELD at 183. But Cf. FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE EDWARD I 230:
.if there is to be any law at all, contract must be taught to know its place."
116. Salt v. Marquess ofNorthampton, H.L. (E) 1,18-19, A.C. 1(1891).

1994

LORD BRAMWELL & POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIBERAL JURISPRUDENCE

313

tracting parties, or even if they were capable of being ascertained, the parties would'automatically take account of them in their bargain.""17
Labor and contract issues overlapped in the 1878 debates over the
Employers' Liability Bill and its modification of the "fellow servant rule."
Trade unions had pressed the courts to modify the prevailing rule, according to which employers (masters) were not liable where one employee
(servant) caused injury to another. For Bramwell, like most of his fellow
jurists, the law was clear and based on contract: "masters and servants
have not 'contracted' that the master shall be liable for a fellow servant's
negligence." He denied that there was any general law according to which
"everybody has a remedy against a master for the negligence of a servant
acting in the master's employment."1l8 On the contrary, he continued to
believe as he had written in 1857: "I have a great desire in all cases to
make the actual wrong-doer alone responsible, and to limit the doctrine of
'respondeat superior."1 19
Unlike the member of the general public exposed by chance to the
negligence of the master's servant, the servant (employee) does have a
contract with his master (employer) and liability for inadequate care or
skill on the part of other contracting servants is not part of that contract.
For Bramwell, it was a central element of contract that "Whenever two
people come to an agreement, there is negatively an agreement that
neither is bound to anything but what is agreed." Unlike the unwitting
member of the public, "it is open to any servant to enter the service and
work with the fellow servant or not, as he pleases"; it is he who can best
120
guard against the defects of fellow servants.
A master's liability for the negligence of a servant acting within the
scope of employment could, therefore, only be real when such liability
was one of the terms of the relation. In addition, an obvious appreciation
of human nature compelled the conclusion that there was educative and
disciplinary value to maintaining the old rule: "Whatever tends to lessen
their reason for care and good conduct (as compensation would) tends to
make them less careful in themselves and more disposed to conceal want
of care in others."' 2' Lack of care on the part of individual employeeshigh as well as low-would likewise result if corporations were held
liable for the actions of their employees. This was one more reason for
Bramwell to believe that corporations were incapable of malice or motive;
only directors or shareholders individually could be guilty of and respon117. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 376.
118. Bramwell's article in The Times, 24 April 1878, excerpted in FAIRFIELD, at 336.
119. Collet v. Foster, 2 H & N. 147, 157 Eng. Rep.147 (1857); see also for the same
position Bramwell's much later opinion in The Apollo, 1891 A.C. 499. The "fellow servant"
rules and concomitant limitations on the doctrine of respondeat superiorhobbled labor law-from their first modem announcement in 1837, Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1,19 E.R.C.
102 (1837) to the present; see e.g. Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1993).
120. The Times, 24 April 1878, supra note 118, at 341, 338, respectively (emphasis in the
original).
121. Id. at 351; see also, Waite v. North Eastern Ry., 120 Eng. Rep. 682 (1859).
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sible for such behavior and its consequences.1 22 In a world of free individuals, anything that extended liability vicariously was both irrational
and unjust.

VI. English Law v. Sacerdotal Socialism
What turned Bramwell and his generation of political economy liberals against Gladstone and his new social liberalism was the latter's rediscovery of "medieval political economy [and] sacerdotal socialism."
Latter-day Liberal politicians asserted that it was the duty of the crown,
parliament, and judiciary-"of the ruling class however appointed"-on
behalf of "Divine Providence to moralize civic relations, to redress
inequalities of fortune and condition, to protect unsuccessful adult competitors, the world's failures, against the penalties and inconveniences of
failure." 123 Whatever the well-known religious component in Gladstone's
24
politics, Bramwell's view of it here was certainly peculiar.1
Even less could Bramwell make truck with the ex-liberal, "fair-trading," social-protectionist imperialists like Joseph Chamberlain. It was
Chamberlain and his sort who sought to reduce the coherent and potentially hegemonic ideology of the political economy liberals to "the convenient cant of selfish wealth." According to Chamberlain, faced with a
"mass of misery and destitution in our midst," the Bramwells of England
"put [it] aside by reference to the eternal laws of supply and demand, to
the necessity of freedom of contract, and to the sanctity of every right of
private property."1 25 Of course, Chamberlain ignored or vastly underestimated the reasons liberal "freedom" was so popular and persuasive, and,
as was the case with the continental social imperialists, such as Jules
Ferry in France and Friedrich Naumann and Max Weber in Germany, the
costs of greater domestic well-being were to be borne in good part by
other less cultured peoples and nations through imperialism.
Having repulsed "the Latin garrison" and upheld the "vital principles
of the leges Angliae," the views of English jurisprudence "were necessarily antagonistic to those of canonical philanthropists and their modem plagiarists," 126 such as T.H. Green, who had dared define liberty positively as
122. Abrath v. North Eastern Ry., II App. Cas. 247,251 (H.L. 1886).
123. FAIRFIELD, at 158.
124. See e.g., DAVID BEBBINGTON, WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE: FAITH
AND POLITICS IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN (1993); JONATHAN PARRY, DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION: GLADSTONE AND THE LIBERAL PARTY (1986) and, more generally, EUGENIO BIAGINI, LIBERTY, RETRENCHMENT AND REFORM: POPULAR
LIBERALISM IN THE AGE OF GLADSTONE (1992); TERENCE JENKINS, GLADSTONE, WHIGGERY, AND THE LIBERAL PARTY, 1874-1886 (1988).
125. Joseph Chamberlain in the 1885 election campaign, reproduced in HAROLD
SCHULTZ, ENGLISH LIBERALISM AND THE STATE 57 (1972), quoted in ATIYAH,
supra note 2, at 587.
126. FAIRFIELD, at 161. The "modem plagiarists" are identified as T. H. Green, Henry
Broadhurst, and Shaw Lefevre-new or social liberals all. For his part, Green at least, was a
practicing Catholic and purveyor of German, especially Hegelian, theory.
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27
"the positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something."1 It
could not have been for naught that Bramwell and the political-economy
liberals had earlier withstood young Tory hostility toward the dislocations
of industrialization. Now, they needed to repulse Tory efforts to revitalize
"humanity and chivalry" through a "sacerdotal Socialism tempered by
128
incoherent reverence for vested interests."
Just as "[tihe moral philosophy of the eighteenth-century [was] antiEnglish and imported," so "the new jurisprudence inspired after 1880 by
sympathy with 'some kind' of Socialism is a denial of national or purely
English origin for vital parts of English law and equity."1 29 "Imported
doctrine" became one of the code words for state interventionism in contract relations, and, notwithstanding Bramwell's own commitment to
"natural justice" or full due process, prior to he deprivation of liberty,130
T.H. Green, arguably the most continental of English philosophers of the
second half of the century, became the bete noire of true political-economy liberals.
In the "New Liberalism," Bramwell saw government officials
"enforc[ing] right-mindedness or compulsory altruism" and threatening to
become the new despots, "crush[ing] civil freedom and individual
rights."131 Their mandate, Bramwell felt, originated only partly in popular
pressures; in the ancient English empiricist tradition, he held theory and
theorizing largely responsible for this new despotism. Set against the formalists' supposed penchant for "neglect[ing] to safeguard popular liberties in the Courts" was the inevitable reasonableness of Common Law.
Notwithstanding an articulated theory of liberal political economy or perhaps necessarily accompanying it, Bramwell and his like-minded colleagues reified "reasonable":

It is no question-begging term, but is the last word of impartiality, learning, and
common sense, interpreting trustworthy information. The best human beings can
do it. The judicial systems of the world might be divided into those which never
knew the word "reasonable" and so decayed, and those which had it and so flourished.132

It was obvious, too, that reason and contract were intimately related.
There was no judicial need to "talk of 'right' and 'just' claims, when the
question should be, 'What have the parties agreed'?" -that is, a determi127. T.H. GREEN, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in 3 WORKS 371 (3d
ed. 1891).
128. FAIRFIELD, at 162.
129. Id. at 185. This remark was likely intended as a slap at the Scots as well as at Latins
of various sorts. "Erudite German Chauvinists"-the Kathedersozialisten-areblamed for
suggesting that English law is something less than fully indigenous. Id.
130. See Parl. Debate (Lords), March 10, 1885, 295 HANSARDS (3d series) 597, at 6012 (debate on Frederick Marshall, a Criminal Lunatic) (Bramwell's insistence on due process
as natural justice.)
131. FAIRFIELD, at 188.
132. Id. at 195. Further: "No word in the language is more illustrious than this one. From
those early times when feudal dues were limited at Common Law because not 'reasonable,'
down to Lord Esher's judgment in Hawk v. Dunn, the word 'reasonable' holds the field." id..

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XXXVIII

nation of and by reasonableness, a quality built on the best combination of
133
English nature and nurture.

VII. Reconciliation With Land and the Rural Elite
As was the case nearly everywhere in the early nineteenth century,
the ascent of commercial interests and liberal judicial ideologies was
accompanied by a thoroughgoing critique of landed interests. 134 Conflicts
between Whigs and Tories were real and substantial; their respective conceptions of politics, economics, law, and governance were decidedly different. Liberal hostility toward landed property and hidebound privilege
was deep. Agrarian protectionism in the broadest sense-from strict liability through statist conceptions of property, traditionalist restrictions on
contract rights and corporations law, defense of monopoly, preferences
for the High Church, and high tariff walls-came under sharp liberal
attack. The founders of political economy were, after all, for the most
part, radicals in their time. 135
The liberal campaign for the repeal of the Corn Laws, with which
Bramwell and his thinking were associated, arguably unsettled English
society even more than did the radical Chartist campaigns.1 36 At mid-century, as they celebrated the Industrial Exhibition and its Crystal Palace
exhibition of steel, glass, international trade, and presumed social levelling, liberals and industrial interests still viewed landed England and its
culture as obstacles to further expansion and greater glory. 137
At some point in the final third of the century, Britain's landed and
133. "Tenants' Rights," a letter in the Economist of 3 December 1881, reproduced in
FAIRFIELD, at 203-04.
134. This was true in virtually all of Europe. The only notable exception was the United
States, where the slaveholding agrarian elite was thoroughly commercial to begin with and
well-integrated into international manufacturing and commerce. As was noted often, from
before 1776 through 1865, in both its economic theory and beliefs about governance, the
white U.S. South was more liberal than not. See e.g., EUGENE GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1965); GAVIN WRIGHT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COTTON SOUTH (1978); JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM:
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH (1991).
135. See e.g., L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 30-109 (1911, 1964); SAMUEL BEER,
MODERN BRITISH POLITICS 33-68 (1965, 1982); W.E. MOSSE, LIBERAL EUROPE:
THE AGE OF BOURGEOIS REALISM 1848-1875 81-98 (1974), HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE, supra note 20, at 97-107, 225-248.
136. Throughout the first half of the 19th century, the Chartist movement, consisting of
artisanal, working-class, and middle class groups, attempted through political agitation of
various sorts to establish and effectuate a practical connection between the political and the
social. The challenge of connecting democracy to the social has remained with us. Despite
much adulation and the recent contribution of the Chartist puzzle to the rise of discourse
analysis, the Chartist failure remains an historical milestone/millstone. See G.D.H. COLE,
THOMPSON, JONES, supra note 100.
137. Further detail is not possible here. See generally, the sources cited in notes 8, 57,
130 supra. In this period, The Economist may well have serve as the flagship for liberal sentiment.
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commercial elites reconciled. Conventionally, this has been understood to
have resulted from working-class pressures, the growth of empire, and the
industrial elite's mimicry of the rural elite's way of life.13 8 In Bramwell's
case, all three factors, along with disgust over "anarchy" in Ireland,
played a role and in his later years produced a startling defense of the
landed elite and of landlordism itself.
Renewed discussion of John Stuart Mill's Political Economy
prompted Bramwell to undertake a wholesale assault on the proposition
that "the land is the original inheritance of all mankind" and that value is
created by its tillers, not by its landlords.1 39 What he found especially irksome-perhaps on account of its applicability to stock and other assetswas Mill's questioning:
What have the possessors done that this increase of wealth produced by other
people's labor and enterprise should fall into their mouths as they sleep instead of
would be
being applied to the public necessities of those who created it? ...It
more reasonable to give the increment to the farmer, who has grown the food,
140
and the railway-owners, who have carried it....

Bramwell's response was bitter and reflected something of a newfound
solidarity between previously hostile elites:
But if this reasoning is true of land, why is it not of other things -of railways,
for example, whose customers have increased while the shareholders were
asleep .... The truth is that Mill in his hatred, not of gigantic incomes, but of
those who possess them, lost sight of the genuine principle that a thing is best
141
improved when its owner has the benefit....

It was analysis such as Mill's that "encourages attacks on property, and is
therefore mischievous."
The great divide that had once separated landed property from industrial property and landlords from manufacturers had by the 1880's apparently all but disappeared for Bramwell. He could now appreciate that discriminatory legislation and quasiconfiscatory policies had choked the
flow of capital into British agriculture-lowering employment, wages,
and productivity. The maximum aggregate social utility sought by freetrade liberals was now endangered rather than furthered by hostility
toward landlordism. The great international capitalist bust of 1873142
138. See e.g., HEINZ GOLLWITZER, EUROPE IN THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM,
1880-1914 (1969); GEOFF ELEY & DAVID BLACKBOURN, THE PECULIARITIES OF
GERMAN HISTORY (1984) (on agrarian-bourgeois symbioses); CANNADINE, supra note
42. For an acute satire of this mimicry, see GEORGE AND WEEDON GROSSMITH,
DIARY OF A NOBODY (1892). The dwindling Radical current within Liberalism was substantially disorganized, drifting somewhat helplessly between the Liberal party and the
working class movement; see DANGERFIELD, supra note 71.
139. "Mill's Political Economy," in The Times 16 February 1885, reprinted in FAIRFIELD at 216-20, here 217.
140. Id.at 218.
141. Id.
142. See Hans Rosenberg, Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression,
1873-96, 13 ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW 58-73 (1943); PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES 71-123 (detailing changes in political landscape wrought by economic
crisis of 1873-97) (1986); RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS 21-60
(1989) (same, with emphasis on international trade and its domestic reverberations).
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inspired what liberals considered neo-medieval talk of state controls on
property and the sovereign's right to treat lands as a public utility. By
1887, Law Lord Bramwell responded to such talk with outrage:
[It is now said that] "no private person can have property or absolute ownership in land; such property or absolute ownership resides exclusively in the State,
as represented by the Crown. The greatest Dukes are nothing but tenants of the
Crown, and the State has a perfect right to prescribe the terms on which it will
allow tenants to enjoy its property." This, so far as England is concerned, is
143
wholly wrong and misleading.

Such talk also "encourages attacks on property, and is therefore mischieVOUS."

144

The Malthusian aspect to classical liberalism was always evident in
its portrayal of industrial labor relations. And, of course, the treatment of
the market as "nature" always lay at the heart of the liberal world view.
But, only late in the century did liberals extend the logic to justify high
land rents:
If one man or ten, or perhaps a thousand men, owned all the land in a territory,
they might fix its price; but, as it is, the price is fixed by Nature. A great deal of
mischievous and dishonest nonsense has been talked about landlordism. Rent
exists in the nature of things and would exist in substance if we had an agrarian
law tomorrow.
.. but for an increase in the population, where productive powers were doubled [through labor-saving instruments], and only half the land was wanted to
feed the population, the competition among the landowners would reduce rent to
45
nothing.1

It is, perhaps, testimony to both the fears generated by the labor
movement and the internal fatigue of classical liberal ideology that its
defense assumed an increasingly static and conclusory air. All property
was the same and mucking with it could help no one:
No doubt, to confiscate land and raise the public revenue out of it would be a fine
thing for all the community, save the landowners. But so would confiscating
chattels be a fine thing for all but the chattel-owners, and the confiscation of
labour would be a splendid thing for all but the labourer.
.1 say, then, that there are no means by which there can be a more general
distribution of land and capital which would promote the wealth and welfare of
46
the community. 1

Bramwell was certain, for example, that if land were redistributed, it
would be a matter of mere months before inequalities of wealth reasserted
themselves in the same or even greater measure while overall production
suffered significantly.t 47
In nearly every society, certain issues test the mettle of the ideolo143. Bramwell letter to The Times, 3 JUNE 1887, excerpted in FAIRFIELD at 224-25.
144. Bramwell's follow-up letter to The Times, 15 June 1887, in id. at 226.
145. Nationalization of Land, Bramwell's review of HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS
AND POVERTY. The review was published in 1883 by the Liberty and Property Defence
League, reproduced in FAIRFIELD, at 229-41.
146. Id. at 240, 250.
147. Bramwell's remarks at the IndustrialRemuneration Conference held by the Liberty
and Property League, Friday Afternoon, at 249-253.
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gies competing within it. Sometimes the issues are accurate touchstones
for assessing what lies at the core of the ideology; at other times, they
merely unloosen atavistic residues and incoherences.1 48 For Bramwell
and many of his Liberal and judiciary colleagues, Ireland did both. The
Irish turmoils offered a fearful augury of democratic mass mobilization
against the status quo:
.. We should remember: (1) The Irish tenants are for separation as a means of
plundering the land-owners. (2) Though I do not think there is a general hatred of
the English.. there is a deep and deadly hatred of many toward us, which would

make Ireland a hostile country if separated. (3) If the landlords are ruined, separation becomes easier. (4) If the constabulary and police are put in Parnell's hands,
we at once have a standing army against us. (5) Self-preservation then compels
149
us to protect the landlords and prevent separation.

It was Ireland and widespread support for Irish goals that led
Bramwell to express the common law goals of criminal punishment and to
treat political crimes as worse than ordinary ones: "the very fact that
[political] crimes do not inspire the same aversion, contempt, and hatred
makes necessary severer punishment." Political justifications have "taken
away one of the strongest deterrents from crime, viz., the desire of the
good opinion of one's fellow-creatures." Political criminality "is a tempting game-immense profit if successful, great consolation and honour if
not." All of this made "the political prisoner the most mischievous of all
offenders."150 And, in the case of Ireland, the most obdurate as well.
VIII. Conclusion
It is perhaps not surprising that a high Liberal jurist's social commentary should prove less inspired and profound-ultimately less persuasive-than his jurisprudential writings. Bramwell's social commentary
sometimes suffers form the lack of cloak, wig, case, and controversy.
Animating principles nevertheless remain and sometimes break through
all the more clearly. It is tempting, at times, to deride figures like
Bramwell, whom Atiyah, for example, sums up as "something of a fanatic,"151 but, we need to remind ourselves just how much of their world
view and how many of their specific legal precepts remain with us

148. Race in American liberalism, language and ethnicity in European socialism, gender
issues in social democracy are among such issues.
149. Bramwell to Col. C. H. Davidson, Honorary Secretary of the Irish Defence Union, 4
January 1886, excerpted in FAIRFIELD, at 287. The Union was formed in 1885 to "checkmate and frustrate the system of boycotting, then unrestrained in Ireland, and to give help to
victims"; id. at 284.
150. Bramwell's letter to The Times on "Political Prisoners," 3 December 1887, reprinted
in FAIRFIELD, at 298-99. On the Irish question within the British framework, see READ,
ENGLAND 1868-1914, supra note 10, at 178-180, 350-356, 505-508. Gladstone's softness
on the Irish question served only to lower further his standing among the political-economy
liberals.
151. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 380.
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today. 152
Indeed, the recent evolution of central and eastern Europe reminds
us all of the endlessly persuasive power of Bramwell's vision of
autonomous individuality based on free contracting by free men in a polity where the sovereign meddles as little as possible into the workings of a
free-market based civil society. Recent events also remind us that the
power of this world view is partly ideological and dependent on the ability of any given social and political structure concretely to deliver material
goods. But, it is only partly ideological, since, like the socialist ideologies
with which it has had to compete, this liberal worldview also harbors an
emancipatory design intended to fulfill human potential. Bramwell thus
represents the premier liberal ideology.153
Above all, as the past two decades especially have reminded us, we
still tend to see society as a nexus of hard and soft contractual relations;
we are, most of the time, inhabitants, if not prisoners, of a market-contractual model of society; and, we cherish the furthest development of the
individual as a noble goal-perhaps even the real justification for social
life.154 It was with a profound sense of the coherence of social life and
legal thinking that Bramwell's memoirist could insist that: "all parts of the
edifice of political economy and jurisprudence are interdependent-each
story or compartment underpinned alike."155 It is difficult to take exception with Fairfield's claim.
For Bramwell and his generation, the underpinnings of their most
noble of cultures was fourfold: "civil freedom, security of property, a high
sense of civic responsibility, and desire to exchange utilities." And the
rights that their edifice housed were: "A general right to individual free152. Either as topics of contention or as law. The work of Richard Epstein, see

Introduction to this essay, is the richest, broadest and, arguably most persuasive, contemporary representation of Bramwell's view of social and legal dynamics.
153. Bramwell's liberalism was thus an ideology in both senses: it was an effective, organizing representation of reality and an obfuscatory distortion of it. See e.g., GRAMSCI, supra
note 102, at 138, 164, 377 (ideology as the arena in which people acquire consciousness of
material social relations); KARL MARX, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY(1846) (ruling ideas
as reflections of values of ruling classes; ideology as obfuscation); ANTHONY GIDDENS,
CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY 195 (1979) (ideology as the conversion of
the arbitrary and constructed into the obviously natural and inevitable); PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164 (1977) (a social order produces the
"naturalization of its own arbitrariness"); GEORGE LICHTHEIM, THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3-46 (1967) (reviewing uses of the concept as both a coherent representation of reality on behalf of a particular social group and as a distortion inhibiting scientific understanding); KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 55-74, 219247, 266-285 (1936) (attempt at a science of socially-based knowledge, both functional and
radically subversive); Clifford Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in IDEOLOGY AND
DISCONTENT 47, 65-73 (D. Apter ed. 1964) (ideology provides adherents a road map,

enabling them to locate particular issues as well as right and wrong generally).
154. The last major re-formulation of this goal was offered by JOHN RAWLS, in A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); cf. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, ED. INTRODUCTION,
LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 5 (1984 ed.); Michael Walzer, The Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism, 18 POLITICAL THEORY 6 (1990)
155. FAIRFIELD, at 174.
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dom...the consequential right of property, giving particular title to the
subject matter of contract... the right of free barter, free exchange within
the four seas." 156 None of these is to be taken lightly, yet every day, we
are made painfully aware of their collective inadequacy, in areas as farflung as industrial tort liability and the "marketplace" of ideas.1 57
There is something of a wistful element to what Bramwell thought
was going wrong in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It is not an
unfamiliar refrain:
Mischief wrought by petty but frequent interferences with personal freedom,
especially with liberty of bargain.
gives, as result, diminished initiative and
self-reliance, less capacity to take responsibility, increased disposition to clutch
58
the apron strings of 'Govemment.'1

Working people and tenants were first and most degraded, returned to a
world only recently transcended, reduced from contract to status.159
Bramwell did not believe that he was living in the best of all possible
worlds. When vexed, as he was by the Irish situation, he could be quite
biting, if not embittered: "Let the reasons of good sense and political
economy which were flippantly banished to Jupiter and Saturn once again
prevail; let people make their own bargains, and let the law enforce them,
and we shall have peace and order again." 160 At other times, however, he
tried to envision what a better world might look like. Ironically, it may
constitute further testimony to our inheritance from men like Bramwell
that the society he visualized was the one in which many of us, some until
recently, thought we lived:
I believe that the best thing for all is that there should be what I believe the
Americans call "the largest pile" [sic]. Though the shares may be unequal, there
will be the greatest bulk to divide, the greatest average share, the greatest amount
of enjoyment, the greatest individual wealth, perhaps, but the least individual
poverty.

16

1

156. Id. at 189, 190.
157. On the inadequacy of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor to societies with unequally distributed resources, see e.g., Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1405 (1986), Mark Tushnet, Corporationsand Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 253-261 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).

158. FAIRFIELD, at 360.
159. In the case of workers and their politicians, the tradeoff was the following: "We
practically reduce you to the legal, noncontracting condition of infants, lunatics, or drunken

men; but, in exchange, we will take some money, or its equivalent, from those with whom
you have relations of hiring, and give it to you." FAIRFIELD, at 354.
160. Bramwell's comment of September 1886 on the Irish Land Act of 1870; quoted in
FAIRFIELD, at 301.
161. Comments made in 1885, context unclear, reproduced in FAIRFIELD at 252.

This common European trope about America set the New World apart from the old for
well over a century. Sometime in this century, it became an ideology and economic strategy
exported to Europe. See e.g. Charles Maier, The Politics of Productivity, in BETWEEN
POWER AND PLENTY 23-50 (P. Katzenstein ed. 1976). Perhaps heralding the Owl of
Minerva, there has been a wave of literature over the past decade analyzing the
Americanization of Europe's political and consumer cultures. See also, EDWARD

MCCREARY, THE AMERICANIZATION OF EUROPE (1964); MICHAEL ERMARTH,
ed., AMERICA AND THE SHAPING OF GERMAN SOCIETY (1993).

